迟到的感恩和悼念

  

我在研究西藏現代史的十幾年裏，得到了很多人的支持、鼓勵和幫助。在研究結果成書出版的時候，我總是盡可能仔細地在“致謝”部分一一列舉這些幫助過我的人。這既是研究和寫作出版的行規，也是我的肺腑之言。我之所以能研究出書，都是因爲有人幫助了我。沒有他們的幫助，我必一事無成。在這些幫助過我的人中，有一些仍然生活在中國境內。由于衆所周知的原因，我不得不避免提到他們的名字，只能一言以概之。我希望將來有一天，當我的書能够在中國大陸發行的時候，我將一一致謝。

通过光传媒安娜女士的努力，我獲知李蔚先生于2020年10月22日逝世的消息，深感悲哀和痛心。我想我應該寫下我對李蔚先生的感激，用這不得不遲到的感激之言，彌補我出書時不能提及李老名字的缺憾。

君子之交淡如水

十幾年前，我在爲研究西藏“平叛”而搜集資料的時候，有一次在網上讀到了一些瞭解當年糾正“平叛”擴大化情况的知情者寫下的文字。從內容和文字風格判斷，這些文字具有極高的史料價值。于是我通過網站試圖聯繫原作者，主要是爲了確證資料的可靠性，幷取得以後研究和寫作時引用資料的許可。由于資料在中國的“敏感性”，我幷沒有抱很大的希望。但是不久，一位名叫李蔚的先生間接地聯繫到我，告知說這些資料是他的友人，一位筆名韓有仁的老幹部依據親身經歷和解密文獻撰寫的部分文稿。我表示希望能用電子郵箱跟他聯繫，他傳話說他還不會用電子郵箱，準備讓孫輩假期回家時爲他設立Gmail信箱幷教會他怎麽用。後來我才知道，李蔚先生出身于1932年，和我聯繫時已經八十歲了。

此後我就陸陸續續地和李蔚先生互有郵件來往，通常都只是三言兩語。李蔚先生告訴我，韓有仁先生的這部書稿是心血之作。他們這些當年派到藏區工作的“老西藏”，如今都已垂垂老矣，經不起折騰了。書稿題材內容如此“敏感”，風險不言而喻，朋友們都勸韓先生別拿出來公開出版，但是韓先生認爲，若畢生默不作聲則對不起當年在藏區工作時視爲兄弟姐妹的藏人同胞。由于內容涉及“平叛”擴大化的錯誤，此書不可能在國內出版。韓先生曾嘗試詢問了一家香港的出版社，出版社最終也以市場預期不佳爲由而拒絕。

在間接獲得許可引用該書資料後，李蔚先生告知我，韓先生同意委托我聯繫出版，幷希望我爲該書代作序言。于是我將書稿交給香港田園書屋。田園書屋黃老闆拿到書稿後當即表示，即使即使自己要賠錢，也一定出好這本書。這就是2013年5月香港田園書屋出版的《一場被堙沒了的國內戰爭》，作者韓有仁。作爲歷史學研究者，我認爲這是一部嚴肅的歷史紀實作品，是在歷史上站得住的著作。

拜互聯網時代之便利，我和李蔚先生一直只用Gmail聯繫。我知道涉藏題材的“敏感性”意味著什麽，深知李蔚先生和韓有仁先生這些老幹部這樣做所冒的風險。我關于西藏現代史的兩本研究專著已經在臺灣出版，有關部門必定注意到了我。兩位老先生是中共老幹部，他們私下和我聯繫，這事本身就會給他們帶來極大危險。我只希望他們平平安安，不要因爲寫作和出版一本書而影響自己晚年生活的安寧。2013年春，我在紐約給李蔚先生郵件說，我即將來中國，相約在北京見一面。就在啓程前兩天，中國駐紐約領事館把我召去，宣布取消了我的簽證。從此我就再也回不了中國。于是，我和李蔚先生的交往，始終只是在電子郵件上有事說事，只限于我的研究。十餘年來，最多是我一年半載發去一個問候。我至今沒有見過李蔚先生一面，和韓有仁先生則從沒有直接聯繫過。

君子之交淡如水。我所出版的書和發表的文章，他大多都讀過。後來我瞭解了李蔚先生在青海工作時期的情况後，更對李蔚先生抱持深深的敬意。李蔚先生是我引爲楷模的長輩師友。

仗義執言大丈夫

李蔚先生是很早就參加工作的文化幹部，又有很高的文學修養。我從網上資料獲知，他生前撰寫的新聞報道、報告文學、文學評論、社會科學論文均曾獲獎。有些作品被譯爲英、法、德、葡萄牙、西班牙、阿拉伯文，或由外國通訊社轉發，或被選作刊授大學教材。在中華人民共和國建國十周年、三十五周年、四十五周年時，省委或省政府均曾頒發獎狀。他曾獲《光明日報》“先進工作者”獎狀，集體獲《光明日報》“特別獎”。主要著作有《周恩來和知識分子》（人民出版社１９８５）、《蘇曼殊評傳》（社會科學文獻出版社１９９１，臺灣國際村書店繁體字版易名《蘇曼殊傳奇》１９９３）、《詩苑珍品璇璣圖》（東方出版社１９９６）、《唐太宗誕生地詩文注釋歷史大事記》（香港亞洲中輝聯合出版公司２００４）、《法國平民革命何以沒有陷入歷史興亡的怪圈》（中國思維網２００６）。

李蔚先生1961年起任職青海人民廣播電臺文藝廣播部副主任，1971年起任青海電視臺黨支部書記、副台長，他參與了青海電視臺的籌建，在電視臺工作了八年。然而他自己對“新聞官”的工作幷不滿意。1978年秋，《光明日報》在青海物色記者，他抓住機會申請調往光明日報駐青海記者站，成功成爲專職采訪報導的記者，直到離休。

作爲《光明日報》記者，除了公開的采訪報道外，一個重要的職能是撰寫內參，而這是一項具有風險，需要勇氣和職業技巧的工作。維基百科有一個長篇詞條——楊小民案。這是一起青海省級高幹子弟故意殺人，案发后却得到輕判的案件，暴露了青海地方上官官相護，徇私枉法，百姓敢怒不敢言的狀况。李蔚先生冒著極大風險撰寫內參，以《楊小民殺人案值得深究，建議中紀委直接派工作組查處此案》爲題，發表于１９８４年１１月５日的《光明日報情况反映特刊》第１５期上，驚動中央，爲此下達了中辦（１９８５）２２８號文件。

受胡耀邦委托，由薄一波主持，從１９８５年１２月６日開始，連續舉行辦公會議，研究對楊案有關責任者的處理問題。为此前後在中南海召開了五次會議。在這樣的會議上，來自地方上真正的知情者只有位卑言輕的記者李蔚一人。在中共體制内工作過的人都知道，向中央告地方當局的狀自然會冒犯權傾一時的“地方官”，風險極大，是“不成功則成仁”的事。由此案可見李蔚先生的正直和擔當。李蔚先生在共産黨的宣傳系統工作幾十年，深知自己必須時刻具備謙虛謹慎的工作作風，但是他始終沒有拋弃公正和良知的常識，關鍵時刻他挺身而出，是仗義執言的大丈夫。

李蔚先生非常關心藏區的狀况和藏民的生活，關心國家民族政策對藏人的影響。對于藏區人民的痛苦，他感同身受，焦灼和悲憫溢于言表。他在一個郵件裏說：“我深知，當前的問題要解决，關鍵在克服大漢族主義。否則，中國不可能安定。我本身是內地的漢族，但終生在青海工作，與少數民族情同兄弟姐妹，我盼著民族和睦日子的重新到來。目前藏族僧侶不斷自殺，每一起自殺，都是對我心靈無情的一刀。我的傷感、痛苦、擔心與憂慮，不是語言所能表達的。”

作爲在藏區工作了一輩子的“老西藏”，李蔚先生晚年有深刻的反省。他在郵件裏說，“僅僅用所謂‘革命的狂熱’，難以充分表述解放後所發生的一切。以藏區來說，我們不僅屠殺了大批藏民，而且根本摧毀了整個藏區社會，從本質上消滅了藏傳佛教，嚴重破壞了高原美好的自然環境。我們成就的一面，遠不足以抵消我們的錯誤。我想後代是絕不會原諒我們正在走的這條‘發展道路’的。”

洞察佛教與現代科學對話的意義

我和李蔚先生的郵件往來，通常都簡短，但是有一次，他寫了很多。

那是2015年，我連續幾年前往印度觀摩旁聽達賴喇嘛尊者和西方科學家的對話，此後搜集了有關科學對話三十年的所有可能找到的資料，决定與丁一夫合作寫本書來介紹尊者和科學家的對話，這就是後來由臺灣聯經出版的《智慧之海》。我將書稿的前四章提前發給李蔚先生，想借助李蔚先生的記者眼光，研判寫這樣一本書是不是有意義。

李蔚先生立即給我回了一封長信。

李蔚先生肯定地說，寫一本書來介紹達賴喇嘛尊者和科學家的對話，十分必要：

我覺得：就尊者與科學家的對話寫本書，十分必要。我認爲：作爲當代最杰出的佛學大師，尊者與當代各類最杰出科學家連續三十年的對話，對人類文化的進步，對人類精神世界的成長，對人類未來的發展，其作用，不可低估。

人類是沿著生理與心理兩個方面成長的。物質産品促進人類的生理成長，精神産品促進人類的心理成長。問題是：人類的生理成長過度，而心理成長滯後。爲什麽全球資源現在面臨枯竭，環境污染如此嚴重，以致地球不再適于人類生存，就是因爲人類不能節制自己，欲豁難填，向大自然索取無窮，不懂得抑制自己的動物性，在“文明人”面前止步了。人越是要滿足自己的生理欲望，越是要向大自然超額索取，而這又反過來刺激了人類動物欲望的進一步發展，如此惡性循環，生生不已，越來越糟，人類陷入了自己動物性的怪圈，突不出來。另一方面，則是人類的精神需求不斷萎縮，既是相對萎縮，又是絕對萎縮，普遍缺乏高尚的心靈追求。和紀元前五世紀左右、所謂“軸心時代”、東西方世界大師輩出、引領時代前進、人類朝氣蓬勃的局面比較，兩千多年來，我們到底有多少心靈成果是值得後人寶貴的？ ……

“人類向何處去？”的問題嚴重地擺在世人面前。把人類的發展引入“正道”，實現生理和精神的平衡發展，是當務之急。兩千多年來，人類除了自然科學外，整體來看，主要是依靠祖先的思想遺産而活，只是在對祖先遺産的理解、闡述、發揮、探索裏兜圈子。現在到了應當突破的時候了。

科學本來是一種心智活動，是人類趣味、好奇心之所在，現在却在很大程度上喪失了探索真相的本性，片面地成爲只是人類“征服自然”的工具，已很難滿足人類心智成長的需要，而宗教，本來是人類心靈的寓所，但受“宗教是毒害民衆心靈的鴉片烟”謬論的嚴重壓抑，在許多地區不能正常發展，人們的心靈無處可以安放，惶惶不可終日；在另外許多地區，則淪爲恐怖製造者們的精神武器，使千千萬萬人受害。從人類自我完善的角度看，人類在精神上幷沒有進化多少。我們在中國大陸看到、聽到、接觸到的壞人、壞事，尤其前所未有。其惡劣、普遍、嚴重的程度，超過歷史萬千倍。駭人聽聞，無可理喻，無可想像，整個社會墮落到了谷底，良心大大地壞了，真正千秋罪人。這樣的人類社會，生存的興味何在？又有什麽值得留戀的？此種情况不變，人類將不是毀于自然灾害，而是毀于自己，毀于自己的勾心鬥角，相互殘殺，而且永無寧日。

李蔚先生看到，這不僅是尊者個人和科學家的對話，這更是科學和宗教的交匯：

科學與宗教本來是精神産品賴以生産的兩支最重要的源泉，但從來被社會視爲水火不能相容，不能協同發展，這就更加重了問題的嚴重性，更難以滿足人類的精神需要，促進人類的健康成長。現在，有了宗教和科學的這種對話，科學事業吸取宗教的有益成分而更爲進步，宗教吸取科學的有益部分而更爲完善，宗教和科學協調發展，各自會提供優良的精神産品。而這兩支力量的結合所産生的合力，更遠大于1+1=2，對人類文化未來的發展，對人類精神世界的純化與充盈，一定會有潜移默化的、然而却是深遠的影響。不是說，現在就會如何如何，短期當然難顯其效，但它糾正了人類發展的偏頗，爲解决人類物質生産與精神生産協調發展的問題，把人類的發展引入了發展進化的“正道”，提供了希望。我覺得達賴喇嘛尊重倡導的科學與宗教的對話，揭開了人類文化發展的嶄新的一頁，爲新人類的形成指明了前進的方向。意義太重大了！

他還難得地闡述了他對達賴喇嘛尊者的看法：

達賴喇嘛是不朽的。就宗教而言，是他把藏傳佛教普及到了全世界，創造了空前繁榮的局面。佛陀創立了佛教，印度的阿育王在相當範圍內普及了佛教，達賴喇嘛則在更大的、全球範圍內推廣了佛教。他是兩千多年來對佛教建設作出杰出貢獻的僅有的第三位偉人。

同時，他又是佛教事實上的改革的倡導者與奠基者（雖然他幷未如此命名，或者他尚未意識到這將是一場影響極其深遠的佛教宗教改革運動）。就我有限的瞭解，兩千多年來，在佛教界，從來沒有人對經典提出過异議。達賴喇嘛是第一個指出佛經有局限性，他糾正了佛經裏已知的錯誤，幷且聲言：只要事實證明佛教裏有誤，就應當改正。他打破了對佛經的迷信與盲目崇拜，教導人們按照佛經的本來面目認識佛經，即：佛經不僅是宗教信仰和精神寄托之所在，而且是人類知識的寶庫，而且教人以認識問題和解决問題的方法。達賴喇嘛既是虔誠的佛徒，但又不迷信佛教。他是第一位以科學的態度對待佛教的智者。他引領佛教走出神秘，撥開層層迷霧，使佛經本來的面目顯現了出來。這件事，意義十分重大。基督教的“宗教改革”在世界引發了一場革命，影響深遠。伊斯蘭教從來沒有經歷過改革，世俗力量與宗教極端主義的鬥爭目前仍然十分激烈，原教旨主義者更不斷發動所謂“聖戰”，危害世界。達賴喇嘛開創的佛教改革，其作用與影響，未來會怎樣，目前無法預計，但一定會引發起相當的震撼。基督教的改革只是教內制度的改革，影響尚且如此之大；尊者所倡導的改革，涉及宗教在現代科學道路上的發展這個根本問題，涉及宗教的現代化問題，其意義之大，無可言說。

就文化而言，達賴喇嘛領導十萬境外藏民，對抗以“打倒舊世界”、不要祖宗、徹底摧毀傳統文化爲職志的共産主義運動，在難以想像的艱難困苦條件下，保存了藏族特有的文化，使之不致絕滅，而這個文化極具特殊性，極其稀貴，是人類文化寶庫的不可或缺的有機組成部分，由于它的存在和對比，揭穿了不僅喪失了宗教慈悲情懷、且滲透著“階級鬥爭”精神、意在煽動仇殺的、遍及西藏全地的“僞藏族文化”的面目，使其無法冒名頂替，欺騙世人。此舉對世界文化事業的多元化發展，厥功至偉。

就少數民族地區的現代化事業而言，達賴喇嘛勇敢地破除了藏區已經傳行幾百年、習以爲常的落後的“政教合一”制度，把先進的現代民主制度帶入了藏區，打開了藏區的封閉的大門，使新風涌入，啓動了藏區向現代化的歷史性轉變。實行民主制是實現現代化的核心問題，達賴喇嘛爲藏區的現代化，奠定了政治基礎。這一基礎將來與內地正在建設的物質基礎相結合，整個藏區的面貌必將大變，前途未可限量。就像蔣經國以專制者之身推行民主獲得成功、揭開了中國歷史新的一頁那樣，達賴喇嘛以“政教合一”最高領袖之身消滅了“政教合一”制度，使藏族的歷史進入了新的發展階段。歷史會永遠記著他的功勛的。

在邊疆與中央的關係上，幾千年來，邊疆不是被中原武力統治，就是少數民族武力進攻中原，鮮有以和平手段解决彼此之間的爭端者。達賴喇嘛順應時代潮流，堅持以和平的手段，解决藏區與中央政權的矛盾，主張在“一個中國”的範圍內，實現真正的藏族的民族區域自治，既符合藏族的長遠利益，又符合中華民族的整體利益。我國人民是熱愛和平的，但是統治階級幷不如此，哪朝哪代不是窮兵黷武，以民衆的血肉之軀鋪路，憑藉武力奪取政權，憑藉武力維護統治。從秦始皇開始，除了秦國最初發迹的彈丸之地爲周室所封賜者外，何代何處非掠奪所得，何代何處非武力所得以保？達賴喇嘛自1974年起，在我國首倡“中道”，主張以和平手段解决民族爭端，這是他對中國社會一個創造性的貢獻，雖因事涉利益集團的實際利益，事涉“階級鬥爭”的革命學說，事涉强大的歷史慣力，因此，目前嚴重受阻，尚未取得突破。但，和平方針畢竟無可戰勝，總有一天會成功。到時，達賴喇嘛所高舉的和平旗幟，一定會在祖國大地上迎風飄揚。

凡此種種，已足以使達賴喇嘛的大名永留青史，而他在世界範圍內倡導幷推動的、已經堅持了30年之久的、科學與宗教的對話，更使他成爲中國乃至世界的一代至聖先賢。他的歷史地位未可低估。

 

李蔚先生說，“鑒于此事的極端重要性”，他建議我要寫一本到幾本書，讓外界瞭解，引起世人的關注。他還指出，要針對不同的讀者有不同的寫法。對普通讀者，要寫得極其通俗，而對願意思考的知識分子，可以寫得更深一些。他說，寫這樣的書，“不僅對現代科學知識要有所瞭解，對佛教同樣要有所瞭解。這兩方面知識的掌握，都非易事。深奧的知識又要用淺白的文字表出。”

最近幾年，我在學習和記錄達賴喇嘛尊者和現代科學家的三十年對話史，翻譯和出版重要對話會後科學家一方出版的著作。我一直不敢忘記李蔚先生在此信中給我的鼓勵：“是歷史把這副擔子壓在了你的肩上。”

最後的囑托

2019年9月9日，我接到了李蔚先生的郵件，這是我收到的李蔚先生給我的最後的信。在這個郵件裏，他給了我兩個附件，囑咐我暫時不要引用。現在，李蔚先生已經去世，我想我可以公開了，以此作爲對長者師友的紀念。

第一份是中共青海省紀律檢查委員會的决定，青紀 [2014] 5號文件。其內容是對筆名韓有仁即《一場被堙沒了的國內戰爭——記1958年青海平叛擴大化及其糾正始末》一書作者的處分。此文件叙述了韓有仁先生從搜集“相關會議文件和資料”，到寫作和出版的全過程。有關部門將整個過程徹底調查，文件中還兩次注明了對李江琳的定性，我被定性爲——“援‘藏獨’分子”。文件說，此書作者“聯繫援‘藏獨’分子李江琳通過香港田園書屋出版社在香港非法出版醜化、抹黑黨的形象的政治性有害出版物《一場被堙沒了的國內戰爭》，幷同意李江琳爲該書作序。李江琳利用其學者身份在互聯網上對該書進行宣傳報道和內容披露，成爲境外敵對勢力惡意攻擊我治藏政策和成果的工具，在國（境）外造成惡劣的政治影響，”等等。

其實，“援‘藏獨’分子”這個頗爲罕見的頭銜，我在被取消簽證而禁止回國的2013年，就有友人通過間接渠道告訴過我，友人的意思是要我謹慎低調，一旦有了這樣的定性，那就不是開玩笑的事情。然而那時我更擔心的是，身處國內的老幹部韓有仁先生，他的書一旦出版，有關部門就一定能查出來龍去脉。然而我仍沒有料想到他受到如此嚴厲處罰。该文件显示，年迈的韓有仁先生被開除黨籍，按12%降低其基本退休費，所有補貼降低一個職務層次。

韓有仁先生出生于1939年。李蔚先生信中告訴我，韓有仁先生原本是副廳級幹部，在受到這一處分後，診斷出患了癌症，動了手術。李蔚先生向青海省委來人一再指出，韓有仁先生的這本著作旨在幫助黨糾正以往的錯失，這些錯失是經過黨中央認可而有黨内正式文件闡明了的，可見韓有仁先生的著作是“香花”而絕非“毒草”。“但辦案人表示，此意見他們不能帶給省委。”

李蔚先生說，他仍然想向青海省委和中央宣傳部寫報告，爲韓有仁先生申訴。但是大氣候之下，此事看来無法辦成。

讀這份文件，我深感震驚。我身在美國，我十多年研究、寫作和出版，不管遭遇了什麽，我是安全的。然而我們不應忘記，那些爲藏人仗義執言的老幹部們所付出的極大的個人代價。

第二個文件是1980年初，李蔚先生以《光明日報》記者身份所起草的內參。正是這份內參稿，經時任青海省委副書記扎喜旺徐批示，引起了中央重視，從而最終在青海藏區開展了對“平叛”擴大化糾偏的工作，改變了无数藏人和家庭的處境。

現在我將此文件附于這篇紀念文字之後，是這篇歷史文獻第一次公之與衆。我感覺，李蔚先生在最後一份郵件裏給我這個文件，帶有讓我保管，留存于世的意思。我想用公開發表李蔚先生四十多年前的這篇內參稿，來表達我對李蔚先生的敬意、懷念和感激。我也想以此來提醒我自己，提醒我的历史学研究同仁，提醒我們的藏人兄弟姐妹們，在藏民族爲保存自身文化，爭取自由和正義的道路上，我們幷不孤獨，我們永遠不能忘記那些爲了公平、正義和人道而不計得失，舍出身家性命，付出了巨大個人代價的志士仁人。

謝謝您，李蔚先生！我們想念您！

首发 光传媒 https://ipkmedia.com/151597/

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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《光明日報》內參稿，請審閱。

同意發。扎喜旺徐元月五日

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青海省一九五八年平叛鬥爭擴大化問題嚴重

據記者從最近召開的青海省統戰工作會議上瞭解：

青海省一九五八年平叛鬥爭擴大化問題很嚴重，使這個地區二十多年來民族關係上結了一個大疙瘩，急需很快解决。

青海省百分之九十六的地區是牧業區。一九五八年，牧業區一些地方發生了反革命武裝叛亂。對叛亂進行平息，是十分尖銳的階級鬥爭。平叛鬥爭完全是必要的、正義的，主流是好的。但是由于當時省委主要負責人對形勢作了“左”的估計，平叛中發生了嚴重錯誤。據最近零星反映，主要有以下幾點：

一、抓人太多。海南藏族自治州共和縣只有廿地公社羊讓部落二十五個人參加叛亂，在平叛中全縣却逮捕了六百五十八人。這個州平叛前後，共捕辦、管制、勞教、監督勞動、戴帽子的一萬0五十七人，占全州總人口的百分之七點四。其中，在關押勞改期間死亡的兩千二百九十一人。在全面叛亂的十個區中，百分之七十至八十的群衆被集訓。集訓中由于生活困難、疾病等原因而死亡九百二十一人。黃南藏族自治州是在叛亂平息以後捕人的，同仁、澤庫兩縣分別逮捕了一千九百六十九人、一千八百九十五人，均達到總人口的百分之十。澤庫縣賽日德三個小部落逮捕了三百0五人，其中有二百四十人死于在押期間的勞教中，占捕辦總人數的百分之七十九點三，而這裏面百分之八十以上是冤、假、錯案。

二、對叛區和非叛區未加區別。當時全省六個自治州中，玉樹、果洛兩州基本叛亂，海南、黃南兩州局部叛亂，海西、海北兩州沒有叛亂。但是當時省委作出了“牧業區發生全域性叛亂”的錯誤估計，擴大了打擊面。海北藏族自治州海晏縣幷未叛亂，但在“先發制人，防患未然”的思想指導下，由上面擬定捕人數字，全縣捕辦了六百四十九人，占總人口的百分之四點五。另一個未叛亂的地區——澤庫縣恰科公社尕什扎四小隊和多禾茂的五個小帳圈，被捕辦的占總人口的百分之九點八。海南賽宗寺沒有叛亂，爲“預防叛亂”，打死了該寺的活佛、阿卡和寺院的長工十八人。貴南縣四次集體錯殺無辜群衆八十六人。一次把四十多個群衆召集在會議室裏“開會”，幾個手榴彈捆在一起投進去，全被炸死。一次把三十多個群衆誘騙下山，幾十頂帳篷堆在一起，點火燒了，人被一陣機槍掃射打死，其中絕大多數是貧下中牧，內有黨員一人、團員二人，年齡最大的七十歲，最小的十五歲。

三、誤整了一批少數民族幹部和愛國的民族、宗教上層人士。海晏縣幷未叛亂，但是少數民族幹部被捕辦了六十七人，占全縣少數民族幹部總數的百分之五十三。澤庫縣團委書記楊旦，對抓人時嚴重地捆綁吊打看不慣，說了句：“捕辦是法律，亂打亂捕不好。”被說成同情反革命，逮捕入獄，死在勞改隊。這個縣當時有愛國的民族、宗教上層人士五十五名（其中，“千戶”三名、“百戶”十四名、活佛三十三人），多數沒有參加叛亂，但在平叛中全部被逮捕。和日部落的“千戶”哇加，是副州長，解放後一直靠攏政府。甘南叛亂後，他聽到消息，就積極動員本部落的人向政府交槍，說服群衆不要參加叛亂。叛亂平息後，他到省上參加了人民代表大會，獎了一面錦旗，但回到州上就被捕了。海南州政協委員普魯哇，在平叛中多次冒著生命危險，爲我平叛部隊偵察敵情，爭取群衆，多次立功受獎，但是平叛一結束就被逮捕法辦。這個州的民族、宗教上層代表人物中，原來安置在省、州、縣、區擔任科以上職務的一百四十三人，平叛中捕辦了一百一十九人，占總數的百分之八十三點二二。

四、平叛期間，只要被看作“叛匪”，物資即被全部沒收。據調查，貴南縣僅一九五八年四個月時間，沒收的現金、存款、銀元、羊毛、皮張、糧食、麵粉、民族裝飾品等共折價達四十八萬元。這還只是沒收財物中有帳可查的部分。大宗的財物、成群的牲畜，沒收後，無帳可查。到底沒收了些什麽，弄不清楚。負責沒收的，有商業科、財政科、統戰部、辦公室、公安局、宣傳部、畜産公司、稅務所、供銷社、民兵連、步騎大隊、糧站、農場、外貿公司、勞改隊、集訓隊、獸醫站、運輸隊、銀行、鄉政府……，不論任何單位、任何人、在任何地方，都可以沒收他人的財物，而沒收來的東西，管理又很混亂，問題不少。

對上述問題，青海省于一九六二年曾根據西北民族工作會議精神作過一些解决，但是由于“左”的思想的影響，此項工作沒有作完，遺留問題很多。藏、漢民族關係一直比較緊張。（“最近，青海省委書記扎喜旺徐[藏]在黃南調查時，連續走訪了五十多頂帳篷，沒有喝上一碗奶茶[這是藏族對來客起碼的禮貌]。”——此句定稿時被删去。李蔚注）。據反映，玉樹駐軍下鄉時連馬草馬料也買不上，藏民不給賣。小孩子哭鬧，大人嚇唬說：“漢人來了！漢人來了！”小孩就不敢哭了，把民族隔閡心理傳給了下一代。黃南宗教首領夏日倉，一九五八年因策劃叛亂被捕，但當地群衆說他沒有搞叛亂，要求徵聘複查他的問題。去年十二月此人死于監獄後，同仁、澤庫兩縣多數群衆在春節期間，不喝酒，不穿新衣，不放鞭炮，不走親戚，以示悼念。前不久，達賴的歸國參觀團，到夏日倉寺院參觀時，上千群衆自動圍上去，哭訴說：“我們的寺院拆掉了，活佛抓掉了，紅保（頭人）沒有了”，影響不好。據玉樹軍分區一位負責同志私下估計，由于民族關係緊張，牧業區重叛的可能性不能說完全沒有。

粉碎“四人幫”以來，隨著其他方面政策的落實，這個問題顯得愈來愈突出。玉樹被判刑的三千多人中，百分之九十五以上現在要求複查。海南共和縣原文衛科副科長格洛，年老病重，刑滿釋放後，盼望在死前將沉冤得到昭雪。本人死後，家屬又指望在她死前爲丈夫伸冤。

在最近召開的青海省統戰工作會議上，來自牧業區各地的同志强烈要求徹底解决平叛中的遺留問題。大家說，甘肅省甘南地區叛亂問題，逐人作了調查，落實了政策；雲南沙甸事件作了平反；寧夏固源地區八次叛亂問題也解决了，我們有什麽理由要把擴大化問題繼續拖下去呢？大家建議省委：

一、把複查解决平叛擴大化問題作爲當前落實政策工作中的一件大事來抓。

二、將省委原來關于牧區叛亂問題給黨中央的報告，根據事實加以修訂，重新上報。

三、組成省、州、縣調查組，深入基層，瞭解情况，拿出具體的政策規定。

大家反映：在青海牧區這樣落後的地區，在落實政策、引導群衆團結一致向前看的原則下，由國家適當撥一筆款，作爲某種補償，在政治上是有利的。

本報駐青海記者李蔚

 

 

 

 

National Review: The Crushing of Tibet

   

A man stands in front of a sign marking 70 years of Chinese rule over Tibet Autonomous Region in Potala Palace Square, Lhasa, Tibet, June 1, 2021.(Martin Pollard/Reuters)

By MICHAEL M. ROSEN

NRPLUS

MAGAZINEJUNE 27, 2022, ISSUE

When the Iron Bird Flies: China’s Secret War in Tibet, by Jianglin Li (Stanford University Press, 576 pp., $35)

The recent depredations of the People’s Republic of China in East Turkestan/Xinjiang have had the unfortunate effect of obscuring and displacing a similar oppression that the Chinese perpetrated in another region: Tibet. More than half a century before it began persecuting the Uyghurs, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) engineered and executed a brutal, enduring domination of Tibet that persists today. But while the Tibetan cause enjoyed its heyday in the West in the 1990s, the region has largely faded from the headlines since.

Jianglin Li, a historian of Tibet, seeks to remedy this forgetfulness. In When the Iron Bird Flies, a masterly account of the CCP’s invasion and subjugation of the Tibetan regions in the 1950s, Li exhumes decades of archival Chinese records and interviews survivors of the onslaught. She tells the story through the eyes of the overwhelmed and ultimately defeated Tibetans, as well as from the point of view of the CCP officials who quelled their hard-fought rebellion.

While even the Chinese-nationalist government had sought to integrate Tibet into the Chinese body politic in the first half of the 20th century, the story truly begins with Mao Zedong’s rise to power. He was determined, no matter the cost, to swallow the Tibetan provinces of U-Tsang, Amdo, and Kham — which form more than a fifth of contemporary China by area. On January 2, 1950, Mao, visiting Moscow, cabled the CCP Central Committee, noting that “although the population of Tibet is not large, its international status is crucial. We must occupy Tibet and reform it into a people’s democracy.” Not for Mao the traditional religious and herding lifestyle of this peaceful people of the northwest steppe; they must be fundamentally remade in the image of Socialist Man.

The People’s Liberation Army entered Tibet in 1950, with Mao signing the so-called Seventeen-Point Agreement dedicated to “modernizing” the Tibetan regions. As part of its charm offensive, the CCP committed that “there will be no compulsion on the part of the Central Authorities” and that “the Local Government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord.” In 1954, the Dalai Lama was fêted in Beijing, winning “election” as the vice-chairman of the First National People’s Congress standing committee, and Mao agreed to delay for six years implementing the socialist reforms he so urgently sought to impose. 

But it didn’t take long for Chinese authorities to abandon this approach. In 1956, according to a CCP county-party committee document that Li cites, Chinese cadres were dispatched to Tibet, aiming to “enlighten” the masses on the reasons for their own backwardness and poverty,” to “launch a grievance-venting campaign,” and to “arouse individual enmity among the peasants and then gradually induce class hatred.” Denunciation rituals and the equivalent of Two Minutes Hate assemblies followed, often accompanied by violence, in rural areas.

These concepts, foreign and menacing to the traditional agrarian lifestyle of the Tibetans, predictably rained down on inhospitable soil. That same year, Tibetans in Kham rose up organically over their “opposition to the forcible imposition of land reform, their refusal to hand over guns, their protest against taxation, their defense of their religion, and their demands for the withdrawal of Chinese  

A dramatic battle ensued around the Lithang monastery in late March 1956, with Tibetan yak-herders and tribesmen resolutely defending their holy spaces against PLA troops and the Tibetan cadres that the PLA had impressed into service. But reinforcements sent from Beijing encircled the rebels, and when two Tupolev Tu-4 bombers — the “iron birds” of Li’s title — unleashed their fury on the temple complex, nearly all the Tibetans perished. (Those same warplanes would later bombard the Bathang and Chatreng monasteries as well, thereby defiling holy places and terrifying the populace.)

Across the region, however, local populations challenged the CCP interlopers, who in turn “annihilated” more than 11,500 of them between March and June 1956 alone. Chinese authorities also began to explicitly target the Tibetan Buddhist faith and its practitioners, aiming, per a July 1958 provincial resolution, to “thoroughly discredit religion until it collapses” and to “cause the majority of religious monasteries to disband.” Qinghai Province (encompassing most of Amdo), for instance, saw 70 percent of its religious leaders arrested or remanded to reeducation camps; throughout Tibet, Li reports, “the vast majority of monasteries were closed down, occupied, or dismantled by the beginning of 1959.”

The decisive battle for the region took place in March 1959 in and around Lhasa, the longtime Tibetan capital. Civilians escaping the violence in other provinces flocked there as the ragtag force of Tibetan irregulars mounted a last stand against the vastly more powerful PLA, whose advanced weaponry pounded ancient temples and the Dalai Lama’s palace complex in Norbulingka. Along with his entourage, the revered leader, no longer in favor in Beijing, raced across the Himalayas into India, along the way formally repudiating the now-dead-letter Seventeen-Point Agreement and declaring the establishment of a provisional government-in-exile.

After Lhasa, the PLA conducted a massive cleanup campaign in the nearby Lhoka and Namtso regions, aggressively deploying its iron birds against scattered rebel forces and civilians alike — the latter constituting 74 percent of casualties, according to Li’s calculations. The Tibetan resistance received limited support from the United States; the CIA’s covert ST CIRCUS program armed and trained a small number of Tibetan fighters in Camp Hale, Colo., but Li demonstrates that American aid amounted to little more than an “operation for gathering intelligence and for harassment.” Even had the United States intervened more forcefully, anything short of a Vietnam-style commitment would have been unlikely to turn the tide.

Ultimately, during its “pacification” campaign, the PLA deployed nearly 250,000 troops across 14 infantry, air force, and cavalry divisions; engaged in nearly 16,000 battles; and slaughtered nearly half a million Tibetans, or 17 percent of the population. As Li writes:

Wherever its iron heels trod, the flames of war were ignited, monasteries collapsed, scriptures were burned, people were killed, and leaders fled into exile. The political system, economy, military, culture, and society of the Tibetan people were completely destroyed. 

The author records the heartbreaking tales of numerous Tibetans who fled the violence to neighboring India, including Drolkar Gye, who escaped the Battle of Lhasa and, 50 years later, still resided in the Dondrupling Tibetan Refugee Settlement. “How was it that I was now in this desolate place all by myself?” she recalls asking herself about her long, solitary flight to India in 1959. “I thought I must be dead and that my soul was passing through this place.” 

We also hear the tragic, inspiring story of Tsering Dorje, who, along with his father and brother, fought the Chinese valiantly in Chamdo, in central Kham. Even after the Dalai Lama had decamped to India, Dorje tells Li, “we wanted to continue the guerrilla war in our homeland.” Eventually captured, released, and redeployed to fight in Tibet, Dorje witnessed the Chinese extinguishment of the final flames of rebellion before escaping to Dharamsala, India.

Li’s organization of this complex material and her occasional chronological and geographical jumps leave something to be desired, as does her uneven interweaving of small-scale and broader storylines; unfortunately, some nuance seems to have been lost in translation from her original Chinese. A sharper and more sustained focus on the key elements of China’s strategy and a more detailed history of pre-invasion Tibet would have helped the reader immensely.  

But When the Iron Bird Flies is nevertheless a careful, illuminating study of the vicious CCP campaign to dominate Tibet in the 1950s. Li unveils hitherto unpublished details of the cruelty of the PLA’s crusade. While liberating Tibet may not be realistic at this stage, the Western world must at least engage with the origins of its plight. Indeed, as none other than the Dalai Lama himself proclaims in the book’s foreword, Li’s exposé enables her readers “to deepen their approach to and understanding of the Tibet problem in the spirit of seeking truth from facts.”

 

https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2022/06/27/the-crushing-of-tibet/

Op-Ed: The naked communist, 60 years later

 By William Haupt III | The Center Square Feb 17, 2020 

“There is little difference between Socialism and Communism. Both control resources without private enterprise. In both, government has the first and last say on everything.”

– Barack Obama

Those of us who lived through the horrors of the Cold War, ran for cover under our desks when the air raid sirens were tested, and witnessed Cubans on makeshift rafts navigating the Florida Straits escaping to the U.S. can’t fathom why anyone would choose socialism over capitalism? When we see socialist, Bernie Sanders winning primaries and his largest group of supporters is age 30 and under, we wonder how can history repeat itself so easily, in our own lifetime; in a country like ours?

We were reminded daily of the evils of communism and socialism by parents, teachers, ministers and rabbis. TV reporters fed us a constant diet of stories about the struggles and hardships behind the Iron Curtain. Everyday our newspapers would show graphic images and report on the tragedies and cruelty that those living within the Eastern Bloc suffered at the hands of despotic leaders. We feared this would happen to us if we did not vigilantly defend our own liberty here on American soil.

Marxist Vladimir Lenin knew communism would be a tough sell so he turned to socialism to achieve communism. By convincing the gullible and jaundiced they’d collectively control all economic and social resources, he created a new brand of communism – Leninism. In his “State and Revolution”, he wrote “socialism is just the lower phase of communism used to facilitate true communist puerility which is its highest phase. Karl Marx believed socialism was the easiest road to pure communism.”

In the early 1960s during the height of the Red Scare, political theorist Cleon Skousen released a shocking book, “The Naked Communist.” It became an immediate best seller around the globe. It was even used as a reference book for the CIA, the FBI, and the White House. It found its way into homes throughout the U.S. and overseas. It was excerpted and translated into seven languages.

Cleon Skousen was an FBI agent, and an adviser to presidents and universities about the dangers of Communist infiltration into our institutions. He lectured in every state in North America and over 60 countries. He was a scholar of law and history and specialized in the U.S. Constitution. In his book he reveals how communists pacifically take control of a nation with progressive engineering.

“Communists possess the fortitude and knowledge to slowly reengineer society.”

– Cleon Skousen

Critics considered Skousen a radical whose theories were extreme since he used analogies and hypotheticals to exemplify how communists and socialists work. Yet this was necessary at a time few Americans realized how they had infiltrated our nation. He illustrates how they maneuver their way into society through the youth of a nation with socialism, which is the precursor to communism. When society one day realizes “how it is now”, is not “how it was” back then, and how it “will be in the future” there is no turning back because their youth will now consider totalitarianism status quo.

His insightful rendering unveils the deceptive nature of communism. It contains a quintessence of over a hundred treatises on socialism and communism written by Marx, Lenin and other socialists. He details how communists and socialists strategically infiltrate an existing political party to achieve their objectives and spread propaganda through spoon-fed information to the media. This was the first time anyone defined how people in capitalist nations are persuaded to choose communism or socialism at the expense of their liberty and freedom.

Skousen shocked America and the rest of the free world, pointing out how easily this is done while few people are aware it is happening to them.

“We must replace individualism with collectivism without society knowing about it.”

– Vladimir Lenin

The book depicts the geopolitical strategy of the Marxist–Leninist Soviets' plan to take control of all governments outside of the Communist Bloc. With the Cold War raging, this book filled an urgent need to explain modern totalitarianism. People learned the tactics communists and socialists use in political parties, unions and patriotic organizations to gain political and social influence in a society. They assume key leadership roles and slowly introduce anti-democratic dogma and leftist ideology.

Skousen claimed history is proof communists and socialists stick to their tried and true basic and successful tactics within set time-tables to reach their goals. He pointed out that they had already invaded mainstream media and were weakening our nation with passive acceptance of socialism and communism. A key stratagem is to destroy the family to impair the bonding unity that creates and molds character and morality. This will also diminish their interest in Judeo-Christian religions.

His penetrating look into geopolitical future contained 45 communist goals to turn capitalism into a communist-socialist state. We can safely say 40 of them have been achieved in America under the guise of liberalism. Jimmy Carter handed them education when he created the Department of Education in 1979. Now progressives use public schools to indoctrinate our youth with Common Core teaching materials.

“It is essential that we educate the educator so we control how they educate others.”

– Karl Marx

Under Obama’s extensive government social engineering, federalists control our healthcare and support a large underclass. Parents today surrender their siblings to government approved pre-K education. This has dramatically affected family bonding and moral development with our youth. It has limited the augmentation of their Judeo-Christian faith education at home and in schools. As a result of this, fewer young Americans attend weekly family church services than at any time in history.

Cleon Skousen wrote, “A communist’s most vital tool is the media.” Socialists invaded our news rooms during the Cold War to spread acceptance of communism and have moved public opinion to the left since. They skew news on elections to elect leftists and excoriate conservative politicians. They pre-sold Barack Obama and facilitated his re-engineering of our socio-economic architecture.

They have done everything in their power to destroy the successful presidency of Donald Trump.

Whether Cleon Skousen was an insightful political analyst or psychic clairvoyant, his message was perspicacious. He critiqued the formula communists and socialists use to take control of a nation. It’s daunting to see how many of their goals are etched in the U.S. today.

Goal 15 was to “Capture a political party.” We need not look any further than the presidency of Barack Obama and the rise of socialism within the Democratic Party today to validate Cleon Skousen’s warnings 60 years ago. He told us this will happen in America if we fall asleep at the wheel as guardians of our democracy.

Marx told us, “Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical.” This is what the liberal controlled media has done to our political environment, and we have bought into this without cognition. We’ve taken their bait, hook, line and sinker. And now they are ready to finish the job next election.

"We cannot expect the Americans to jump from capitalism to communism, but we can feed them small doses of socialism, until they awake to find they have true communism."

– Nikita Khrushchev

https://www.thecentersquare.com/national/op-ed-the-naked-communist-60-years-later/article_dad8f2bc-51aa-11ea-bb87-6336083758e9.html 

 

The Naked Communist: Exposing Communism and Restoring Freedom

 

by W. Cleon Skousen (Author)

Soon after its quiet release during the height of the Red Scare in 1958, The Naked Communist exploded in popularity, selling almost two million copies to date and finding its way into the libraries of the CIA, the FBI, the White House, and homes all across the United States. From the tragic falls of China, Korea, Russia, and the UN, to the fascinating histories of Alger Hiss, Whittaker Chambers, Elizabeth Bentley, and General MacArthur, The Naked Communist lays out the entire graphic story of communism, its past, present, and future.

After searching unsuccessfully for a concise literature on the communist threat, W. Cleon Skousen saw the urgent need for a comprehensive book that could guide the American conversation. So he distilled his FBI experience, decades of research, and more than one hundred communist books and treatises into one clarifying, readable volume that became a touchstone of American values and earned praise from the likes of President Ronald Reagan, Glenn Beck, and Ben Carson. Lauded by one reviewer as “the most powerful book on communism since J. Edgar Hoover’s Masters of Deceit,” this text draws a detailed picture of the communist as he sees himself: stripped of propaganda and pretense. Readers gain a unique insight into the inner workings of communism—its appeal, its history, its basic and unchanging concepts, even its secret timetable of conquest.

Among the many questions The Naked Communist answers are:

* Who gave the United States’ nuclear secrets to the Russians?
* How did the FBI fight communism after it was forced underground in 1918?
* Why did the West lose 600 million allies after World War II?
* What really happened in Korea?
* What is communism’s great secret weapon?
* What lies ahead?
* What can I do to stop communism?
* How can we fight communism without a major war?

Now updated for 2017, this edition includes a chapter on the forty-five Communist Goals, detailing how forty-four of those goals have been achieved in the U.S. already, as well as a chapter on the making of The Naked Communist, shedding light on how this book has sold almost two million copies. As relevant now as it was sixty years ago, Skousen’s groundbreaking work provides a renewed understanding of one of the greatest threats facing America today. [Amazon.com]

Mao Zedong and the Third National Security Conference

Written by Yin Shusheng 

(Former Executive Deputy Director of Public Security Bureau, Anhui Province,

also worked in Public Security Bureau, Qinghai Province)

Translated by Jianglin Li

(Author of Tibet in Agony: Lhasa 1959)

Edited by Matthew Akester

*All notes and square brackets added by translator*

 

A page from the Third National Security Conference

Partial instructions of Mao Zedong to Huang Jing[1]

In the 17 years prior to the Cultural Revolution, the Ministry of Public Security held a total of 14 national public security conferences. Most of these conferences were directly guided by Mao Zedong.  The Third National Public Security Conference in particular, held in Beijing from May 10 to 15, 1951, was under the direct leadership of Mao Zedong, to which he devoted great energy. The first draft of the Resolution of the Third National Public Security Conference passed at the conference was penned by Peng Zhen (彭真)[2] and Luo Ruiqing （罗瑞卿）.[3]  However, dissatisfied after reading it, Mao Zedong personally revised the document four times, making so many changes in the manuscript that the original became virtually unrecognizable. In a sense, this resolution was actually written by Mao Zedong himself.

The Third National Public Security Conference was originally planned in June and July 1951, with the agenda of reporting and summarizing situation regarding theSuppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign throughout the country since the “Double Ten Directives” [4] were issued, summing up and exchanging experiences, and deploying tasks for the second phase of the campaign. However, at the beginning of May, Mao Zedong called Luo Ruiqing and made it clear to him that the Third National Public Security Conference could not wait till June or July, it must be held immediately. Following Mao Zedong’s instructions, the conference time was shifted to an earlier date to May 10th, during which the resolution was passed.  On May 16th, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) approved the resolution and forwarded it to provincial party secretaries, requesting that  "the entire party and the entire army must resolutely and completely implement [the resolution] as such."

At the Ninth National Public Security Conference in 1958, Luo Ruiqing summed up the public security work in the past nine years since the founding of the People's Republic of China: "The Third National Public Security Conference is an meeting with great significance not only in the history of our public security work, but also in the history of our party.   This conference played a decisive role in consolidating the achievements of the first large-scale Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign, enabling us to prevent and timely correct mistakes. This meeting is also the key that allowed us to eliminate remnants of the counter-revolutionaries in a short period of time without making mistakes of proliferating the movement.”

Luo Ruiqing spoke highly of the Third National Public Security Conference because it was directly related to the content of the " Resolution of the Third National Public Security Conference" (hereinafter referred to as the Resolution) drafted by Mao Zedong himself. Let us take a look at the main content of the "resolution", you will have a better understanding.

The Resolution issued a clear order that the large-scale Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign must be pulled back and recuperate immediately. Within the next four months, with the exception that the counter-revolutionaries who had carried out sabotaging activities must be arrested and sentenced, all other arrests and killings must be temporarily suspended ;  and that the number of  counter-revolutionaries to be killed must be limited to certain population ratio, that is, around 0.5 to 1‰ of the total population, the highest ratio could not exceed 2‰. Authority of approving arrests should be taken back from the county level to prefecture and commission level; authority of approving killings should be taken from the prefecture level back to the level of province, autonomous region and directly governed cities. 

In addition to these regulations, the Resolution also stipulated that future arrests and executions must be in accordance with the following principles: make sure not to arrest those who could or could not be arrested, to arrest them would be considered as committing an error; making sure not to kill those who could or could not be killed, to kill them would be considered as committing an error. Principles of killing counter-revolutionaries were as the following: those who had blood debts or had committed other serious crimes (such as rape) and had to be killed to assuage the people's anger, and those who had caused serious damage to national interests must be given death sentence and execute immediately. For those who did not have blood debts and no public resentment, and those who had caused serious damage to the national interest but had not yet reached the most serious level, but whose offences were serious enough for capital punishment,  the policy of death penalty with a two-year execution suspension and forced labor to observe the aftereffects should be adopted.

The Resolution specifically requested that execution of the counter-revolutionaries swept up from the Communist Party, the people's government, and the People's Liberation Army systems and the cultural and educational circles, the business sector, the religious circles, the democratic parties and people's organizations whose offenses were serious enough for death penalty should follow the principle that  in general 1 or 2 in every ten should be executed, the other 8 or 9 should adopt the policy of death penalty with a two-year execution suspension and forced labor to observe the aftereffects. The resolution also contains contents of sorting out accumulated cases, organizing prisoners into reform-through-labor camps in order to create national wealth, etc.

Why did the Resolution urgently put on the brakes to the large-scale Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign that was in full swing? The reason was that since the campaign started, in a short time of just a few months, more than 2 million people had been arrested, and more than 500,000 killed.  Mass arrests and killings continued into May, and the momentum did not show any signs of weakening. Instead, the pervasive feeling among party, government, and military cadres at all levels, the ones who were responsible of leading the campaign, especially the local and county-level cadres, was to make more arrests and killings. They conducted hasty arrests and killings. In many places some of the “borderline” people were arrested and killed (investigations showed about one-third in each category) , some were even mistakenly arrested or killed. If no emergency brake was put, more would have been arrested and killed, and the consequences would be unimaginable.

Regarding the number of  arrests and killings in the Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign, Xu Zirong, executive deputy minister of the Ministry of Public Security, said in a report in January 1954: Since the beginning of the Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign, more than 2.62 million arrests were made nationwide, among those, 712,000 were executed, more than 1,290,000 imprisoned, 1,200,000 successively placed under surveillance, and more than 38,000 released after education. What Xu Zirong said was the general number of arrests and killings in the first large-scale Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign. This campaign, however, lasted for three years and was divided into three phases. The first phase was from October 1950 to September 1951; the second phase from October 1951 to September 1952; the third phase from October 1952 to the end of 1953.

According to the statistics from public security department, the number of killings in the first phase accounted for about 75% of the total killings in the campaign. Taking the killings as 712,000, more than 543,000 killings took place in the first phase, mainly in the months of February, March, April and May of 1951. Since the first phase of the campaign was initiated after the “Double Ten Directives” were issued, there was a process of communication, organization, and implementation. The actual implementation began in January 1951, and the climax was in the four months of February, March, April and May. Only a small number of arrests and killings occurred before January 1951. The four months from June to September were period of restriction and recuperation, the requirement was to suspend arrests and killings (except for current offenses). Therefore, the 500,000 plus killings executed in the first phase mainly took place in the four months of February, March, April, and May. In just a few months, more than 500,000 people were killed, surpassing the total number of deaths in the three major battles (Liaoshen, Pingjin and Huaihai) in the civil war. This was truly astonishing. (According to the Full History of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, during the four years of the Liberation War, death toll in our army was about 300,000, that of the Kuomintang army was 400,000, added up to 700,000. Combined death toll in both the Kuomintang and Communist armies in the three major battles of Liaoning, Pingjin and Huaihai was more than 400,000.)

At that time, the party, government, and military leaders in the entire country were busy with executions, and were rushing to kill. Some people were arrested the day before, and were shot to death in the next day or even in the same day, some were arrested at night and shot in the daytime. If situation continued in this way, big trouble was ensured!  More importantly, the left-wing sentiment prevailed among the party, government, and military leading cadres commanding the Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign,  they demanded more arrests and killings. If this ideological tendency was not corrected in time, the campaign would develop toward the wrong direction. Mao Zedong saw the seriousness of the problem and gave clear instruction: "Do not overkill, too many killings will cost us social sympathy and lose labor power."

The question is: how did the storm of hastiness, of mass arrests, mass killings, wrong arrests and wrong killings started? Fundamentally it started from the Central Committee. In the early days of the campaign, some leaders were timid and hesitant and failed to render effective strikes on current Counter-revolutionary activities. Mao Zedong criticized the tendency of "leniency without boundary." In the “Directives on Correcting the Right-wing Bias in Suppressing Counter-Revolution Activities” [i.e., “Double Ten Directives”] ，the CCP Central Committee made this point: “A serious right-wing bias exists on the issue of suppressing counter-revolutionaries. As a result, a large number of ringleaders and wicked counter-revolutionary elements who continued to do evils after the Liberation and even after being leniently treated have escaped the punishment they deserve.”  However, at the same time, the "Double Ten Directives" also made it clear that in order to prevent the "left-wing" tendency, it is necessary to insist on emphasizing evidence, investigation and research; confession under duress and torture were strictly prohibited.

On the issue of how to implement such a large-scale campaign and how to ensure its healthy development, the Central Committee and Mao Zedong did not put forward effective and operable measures. They continued to use the methods of the revolutionary war and mass movement instead of the legal approach. At the beginning of 1949, the CCP Central Committee announced the abolition of the "Six Codes". [5] Since then, no new laws have been enacted to replace them. Although the Government Administration Council later introduced “Regulations on Punishing the Counter-Revolutionaries," they are all substantive and difficult-to-grasp principals without procedural regulations. Therefore, the large-scale Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign was in fact in a state that there was no law to abide by, relying entirely on the documents issued by the Central Committee and the instructions from the top leaders, mainly from Mao Zedong.

To lead the campaign, Mao Zedong used the same methods he used to command war in the revolutionary war era. On the issue of arrests and killings, quotas, fixed tasks and deadlines were imposed. He fell on subjective judgment and was eager for quick results by constantly issuing instructions,[6] demanding certain number of arrests and killings at certain places must be done by certain time.  Although the "Double Ten Directives" required "laying stress on evidence and not too ready to believe confession " in the campaign, and  "death penalty must been approved by provincial, municipal, district and the commissioned local committees" , when pressed by deadlines, task requirements and quotas imposed by Mao Zedong, it was impossible to follow these regulations,  not to say that the authority to arrest and kill had been transferred by Mao Zedong the supreme leader to lower level.

Let us take a closer look at how the Central Committee, mainly Mao Zedong, led the campaign by issuing orders.

On January 17th, 1951, Mao Zedong received a suppressing Counter-revolutionaries report of the 27th Army stationed in western Hunan province submitted by the South-Central Bureau. The report stated that in the 21 counties of western Hunan the garrison troops alone had executed more than 4,600 bandit leaders, local bullies and spies, and prepared to let the local government to kill another batch. Mao Zedong penned the following comment: "This move is very necessary," and stressed that "it is necessary to kill a few more big batches, especially in the places where bandits, bullies and spies are congregated, " demanding that "all the localities must be quick to follow this example without fail."

On January 22nd, Mao Zedong telegraphed the South China Bureau and the leaders of the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee: "You have killed more than 3,700, which is very good, kill 3,000 or 4,000 more," "You can set killing 8 or 9 thousand as the goal for this year." On January 29, the Ministry of Public Security reported to the Central South Military and Political Committee [7] that Hubei Province had made 19,823 arrests, including 160 within the provincial government. The Ministry of Public Security made this remark on the report: " Making arrests without internal and external distinguish may easily cause panic and ideological fluctuations among cadres." Mao Zedong saw this remark, and criticized the Ministry of Public Security: "Hubei is doing very well, don't dump cold water on them."

On February 5th, the Northwest Bureau of the CPC Central Committee reported that more than 5,000 had been arrested in two months and more than 500 had been killed. In general, the killings were not strong and powerful enough, and the procedure was slow.  However, it was required that the implementation of the suppressing counter-revolutionaries plan must be stable and steady, and all killings must be approved by the province (this is the requirement of the "Double Ten Directives” - the author). After reading the report, Mao commented: "Regarding the death sentences, execution of mild cases can be approved by prefectural level." Subordinates followed the example set by their superiors, thus in many places, the authority to approve killings was transferred from the prefectural level further down to the county level.

In the Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign, whether a criminal should be killed was not decided in accordance with his crime, but was based on the quota set on population proportion, which required that certain number of people must be killed in a certain place or city.   This is the biggest absurdity. Mao Zedong originally demanded that the proportion of execution should reach 0.5 ‰ of total local population; in a place where the situation was more serious, it should reach 1 ‰ of total local population. Later, he said that some places can exceed this quota, but not more than 1.5 ‰, and the most should not exceed 2 ‰.

In mid-February 1951, Mao Zedong directly telegrammed the heads of the Shanghai and Nanjing party Committees: "Shanghai is a big city with a population of 6 million. Based on the situation that in Shanghai, more than 20,000 arrests have been made but only over 200 were killed. I think that in the year of 1951, at least around 3,000 bandit ringleaders, professional brigands, bullies, spies, and superstitious organizations and secret society leaders should be killed. At least about 1,500 should be killed in the first half of the year. Please consider whether this number is appropriate.  In Nanjing, according to the February 3^rd telegram sent by Comrade Ke Qingshi[8] to Comrade Rao Shushi,[9] 72 had been killed and the plan was to kill another 1,500. This number is too small. Nanjing is a big city with a population of 500,000 and the capital of the Kuomintang. Reactionary elements should be killed seem to be more than 2000.” “Nanjing kills too few people; more should be killed in Nanjing!"

On February 2, 1951, the Administrative Council issued “Regulations on Punishing Counter-Revolutionaries". Mao Zedong immediately instructed [leaders of] Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao, Shanghai, Nanjing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Chongqing and other provincial capitals, saying that these places were “important nests of counter-revolutionary organizations. Reconnaissance and arrests must be arranged in a planned manner. Within a few months, a large number of counter-revolutionaries with serious crimes and well-found evidence must be killed."

On February 17th, 1951, under the direct leadership and command of Luo Ruiqing, 675 arrests were made overnight. On the second day (February 18), 58 were publicly executed. At the night of March 7th, another 1050 were arrested, and 199 were publicly executed on 25th. Mao Zedong gave Beijing his full affirmation. To implement Mao Zedong’s instructions, the CCP Tianjin Municipal Committee reported in early March that on top of the 150 executions already done, another 1,500 executions had been planned. Mao Zedong commented: "I hope that Shanghai, Nanjing, Qingdao, Guangzhou, Wuhan and other big and medium-sized cities will have an operable suppressing counter-revolutionary plan for the next few months to the end of this year. The masses have said that killing the counter-revolutionaries is more exciting than enjoying a thorough rain. I hope that every big and medium-sized city will kill a few large batches of counter-revolutionaries."

In accordance with Mao Zedong’s repeated urge and instructions to “kill a few large batches of counter-revolutionaries”, the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee reported to the Central Committee: “Shanghai is determined to give a free hand in making another  10,000 arrests, 3,000 executions, 4,000 imprisonments and 3,000 supervisions on top of the 1,068 arrests and the more than 100 executions already made.  " Mao Zedong fully affirmed the Shanghai Party Committee's attitude of correcting the overcautious approach on making arrests and executions, and the action-plan of major arrests and executions. He immediately cabled the Shanghai Party Committee: "If you can arrest more than 10,000 and kill 3,000, it will play a great role in promoting the suppressing counter-revolutionaries work in other cities. You should take note to rapid trial after arrests were made, the first batch to be killed ought to be set in about half a month, sentencing and execution should be done every couple of days after that.” Following Mao’s instructions, the Shanghai Party Committee arrested 8,359 people in one day on April 27, only 3 days later, 285 were executed in one day on April 30, and 28 more were executed on May 9. After the "Resolution" was released, due to the inertia, Shanghai’s mass arrest and executions did not stop right away. On June 15th, 284 more were executed, and every few days, a group of people, sometimes a couple of dozens, sometimes 140 or 150, were shot to death after that.

Due to Mao Zedong’s supervision and encouragement, arrests and killings went out of control. Some localities requested to break through the arrest and killing quotas set by the Central Committee, especially the killing quotas. The Guizhou Provincial Party Committee proposed that unless the number of killings reached 3‰ of the total population, problem would not be solved. Southwest and South China [bureaus] also requested to break through the quotas. By the beginning of May 1951, Guangdong and Guangxi provinces had made 188,679 arrests and 57,032 executions, among the executions, 10,488 were made in Guangdong in April alone. By the end of April, more than 358,000 arrests were made in the region of East China, and more than 108,400 were executed, accounting for 0.78‰ of the total population. In the southern central regions, in early May, more than 200,000 people were executed, close to 1.5‰ of the total population.  

The situation of unorderly arresting and killing had drawn the attention of some local party committees. On the eve of the Third National Public Security Conference, the CCP Shandong Branch issued a notice stipulating that “the proportion of killings in Shandong, regardless in the city or in the country, should be less than 1‰.” (This is due to the fact that Shandong had already finished land reform, during which many landlords and local bullies had been killed, killings in both campaigns added up had already exceeded the quota of 1‰ - the author).

On the 23rd of March, Huang Kecheng, secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee, reported to the Central Committee and Mao Zedong: "There have been cases where the scope of arrests has been expanded and the handling is sloppy - and it has begun to involve internal (underground party branches, enterprises, governments and institutions), and the struggles with the hidden counter-revolutionaries needs to be more refined. " “We intend to hold back immediately – to limit the scope of killings, and the struggle is to be carried out in a planned and step-by-step manner." He was the first provincial party committee leader to propose holding back the campaign and limit the scope of arrests and killings. But Mao Zedong ignored it.

Meanwhile, in mid-April, the South-Central Bureau ordered Hunan, Henan, Jiangxi, and Hubei provinces to stop mass arrests and executions, and to return the authority of approving executions to provincial party committees. However, the result had been minimal. After the order was issued, in less than one month, from late April to mid-May, more than 50,000 people were executed in these four provinces, and majority of them did not go through the approval procedures. It was clear that the problem could only be solved by the person who started it. To correct the disorderly situation of mass arrests and executions, Mao Zedong had to attend to the matter personally and issue instructions to effectively halt it.

Mao Zedong began to worry that the number of killings was getting bigger and bigger and that the situation had gone out of control. On April 20, he cabled secretaries of all CCP regional bureaus, requesting them to control the execution proportion: "Although the Central Committee meeting in February had decided that the standard of execution number was temporarily set as 0.5‰ of the total population,  but now the Southwest has reached 1‰,  and some provinces in South Central and the East China have reached 1‰, and some places have already exceeded [1‰]. Generally speaking, it seems that to solve the problem the three regions of East China, South Central and Southwest all have to exceed 1‰. However, it does not seem to be appropriate to exceed too much. The Liuzhou prefecture[10] wanted to kill 5‰, which is obviously wrong. Guizhou Provincial Party Committee has requested to kill 3‰, that I feel is too many. I have the idea that 1‰ can be exceeded, but not too much. Don’t set 2‰ in general as a standard.   It should be a norm to list many prisoners as life sentence, take them away from their hometown to be concentrated by government in batches, and put them in productive work to construct roads and dams, cultivate wasteland, and building houses. For example, of the 60,000 more prisoners the southwestern region has planned to kill, just kill about 30,000 to assuage popular indignation, and gather the remaining 30,000 in batches to do production work.” “Take at 0.5‰ of the population, there are more than 150,000 people in the three regions of Southwest, South Central and East China [to be killed], that is a big labor power" (that is, if the three regions followed their original plan and keep the execution ratio at 0.5‰, they would kill 150,000 less. In fact, all [three regions] have exceeded 1‰. If 1.5‰ ratio is reached, 300,000 more will be killed - the author); "Guizhou Provincial Party Committee requested to kill another 22,000 to 25,000. We can allow them to kill a little more than 10,000, leaving more than 10,000 not to kill. This already exceeds the 2‰ ratio.  To handle the situation in accordance with Guizhou’s special circumstance, it will be considered as [striking] hard and on target. “ ( Using special circumstances as an excuse to allow Guizhou to break through the quota of 2‰, this means that it does not matter for other places to break through the quota and kill more. There is no determination to correct the mistake. - the author).

He then telegraphed leaders of the South China Bureau: "Based on the situation that more than 57,000 have been killed in South China, and there are still more than 160,000 imprisoned, the two provinces and one city in South China (Guangdong, Guangxi provinces and Guangzhou City - the author) should stop arresting for four months starting from June 1, focusing on sorting out accumulated cases, summing up experience and educating cadres.  The same is also applicable to Henan, Hubei, Human and Jiangxi [provinces].” Since Mao gave Guizhou permission to break through the quota, his instruction will not be implemented resolutely by the two provinces and one city of South China.

At this time, Mao Zedong felt that his instructions and telegrams alone were not enough to halt this powerful storm of mass arrests and killings. He must immediately call a meeting, summoned the “local vassals" and make arrangements to step on the brakes in person, otherwise more heads will roll on the ground. 

Once the "Resolution" was passed, the Central Committee immediately forwarded it by telegram to local authorities, and the mass arrests and killings took initial restraint. However, due to inertia, some places continued to make unnecessary arrests and killings. For example, in East China, the May 1951 statistics showed that a total of 358,000 people were arrested and 100,840 were killed; in October, the statistics showed 468,385 arrests made and 139,435 killed. This means that in the few months following the Third National Public Security Conference, another 110,000 were arrested and 40,000 executed. It was a big discount in the so-called “stop arresting and killing for four months”. However, with the gradual implementation of the Resolution of the Third National Public Security Conference, the momentum of arresting and killing people was held back to a certain extent. The actual number of arrests and killings nationwide in the second and third phases of the campaign in the following two years had relatively large decline. The total number was only about a quarter of the arrests and killings in the first few months of 1951. No doubt that the Resolution played its roll.

Sixty years have passed since the first large-scale Suppressing   of Counter-revolutionaries Campaign took place, and many lessons can be summed up. After years of war, people needed to recover.  When the new regime was established, those in power should adopt a policy of leniency, trying best to fill the social rift and win support from all walks of life. Unless those who have to be killed, do not take killling lightly . The 1,107 war criminals captured from the Japanese aggression against China, each one of them caused unprecedented disasters to the Chinese people. However, they were well treated in the War Criminal Management Centre. After a few years, they were granted amnesty and were back to Japan. The ordinary counter-revolutionaries in China, those who had no blood debts, and no serious current sabotage activities, why can't they be given a chance to live and must be killed?! 

Take the 81county magistrates in Guizhou Province during the Kuomintang era as an example, when the People's Liberation Army liberated Guizhou, some of them changed sides, some surrendered, some were arrested and released, a few of them were given jobs, and majority of them had already been handled in accordance with their specific situation. However, in the killing frenzy of Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign, every single one of them was killed. Can it be that their crimes were bigger than that of the Japanese war criminals?

Regarding the death penalties, why were they handled so sloppy and lightly?  Tongcheng County (桐城县), Anhui Province planned to kill 16 counter-revolutionaries and submitted the cases to the Anqing Prefecture Party Committee for approval. The party committee reviewed the cases and disapproved all of them. Related documents were sent back to the county.  Without so much as opening the envelop to check the content, officials in the county public security department assumed that the death penalties were approved. All the 16 people were dragged to the execution field and shot to death. Among them, 5 were baozhang,[11]  4 were Youth League of the Three Principals of the People[12]  district branch members, 3 were gendarmes, 2 were local branch heads of the Persistent Way, a religious sect, and 6 were landlords. None of the 16 individuals had blood debts or committed rape. Later those cases were reviewed and it turned out that 11 out of the 16 should not even be arrested and would have to be released immediately. When several bully landlords were executed in the Fuyang (阜阳) area, a few women who had slept with them were also killed together with them. Their crimes were "disgraceful behavior that brought shame to the laboring people." There were also innocent people who had been killed by mistake, including many people who risked their lives to engage in underground work [for CCP]. They had managed to escape numerous assassination attempts by Kuomintang spies, only to be killed by people of their own side, This is truly unimaginably ridiculous. 

Since the experience and lessons of the first large-scale Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign have never been carefully summed up, these mistakes have been repeated in successive political campaigns after that, causing enormous disasters for the Chinese people. The first Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign was followed by the Campaign of Eliminating Counter-revolutionaries,  Agricultural Cooperative Movement and the Socialist Transformation in Industry and Commerce Movement, the Anti-rightist Struggle, the Great Leap Forward Movement, and the “Four Clean-ups” Movement. Following the requests from the CCP Central Committee, local public security bureaus had to make arrangement for struggle against the enemies, suppressing the counter-revolutionaries was used as an important means to ensure the smooth progress of those political campaigns. That was the reason that before 1976,[13] China's suppressing counter-revolutionaries movement has not really stopped, and it continued all the way to the Cultural Revolution when "Six Regulations of Public Security" was issued. Movements like Clean-up Class Ranks，One Hit and Three Antis, Special Case Investigations, etc. were continuation of suppressing counter-revolutionaries, and all carried out in the same manner. No legal procedure was followed, completely lawless.  The Chinese people have been greatly devastated and hurt again and again.

Source:  Yin, Shusheng, “Mao Zedong and the Third National Public Security Conference”. Yanhuang Chunqiu, No. 5 (2014). Internet version: http://www.yhcqw.com/36/9484.html

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[1] Huang Jing (黄敬，1912-1958), the first mayor of Tianjin City. For the complete document,  See Mao, Zedong. Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao. Volume 2 (1951. 1 – 1951. 12) [Beijing]: Zhong yang wen xian chu ban she, 1987. Semi-classified.

[2] Peng Zheng (October 12, 1902 – April 26, 1997)，deputy director of Commission of Politics and Law of the Government Administration Council and mayor of Beijing. [All notes added by translator]

[3] (May 31, 1906 – August 3, 1978) ，first Minister of Public Security from 1949 to 1959.

[4] Referring to “Central Committees’ Directives on Correcting the Right-wing Bias in Suppressing Counter-Revolution Activities”, one of the key documents in the Suppressing Counter-revolutionaries Campaign. It was issued on October 10^th, 1950, thus popularly known as “The Double 10 Directives”.  

[5] “Six codes refers to the six main legal codes that makes up the main body of law in the Republic of China, including the  Constitution, Civil Code, Code of Civil Procedure, Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure and Administrative Laws.

[6] In  Jiaguo yilai Mao Zedong wegao Volume 2 (1951. 1 – 1951. 12) [Manuscripts of Mao Zedong since the Founding of the Country: 1951. 1 – 1951.12] collected 79 instructions on Suppressing Counter-revolutionary Campaign from January to May. See Mao, Zedong.  

[7] The author probably made a mistake here. Should be the other way around, i.e, the Central South Military and Political Committee reported to the Ministry of Public Security.

[8] Ke Qingshi (柯庆施;  1902 –  1965), then mayor of Nanjing.

[9] Rao Shushi (饶漱石；1903—1975) ，then Chairman of Military and Political Committee of East China and General Secretary of East China Bureau and First Secretary of CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee.

[10] Today’s prefecture-level city in north-central Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region.

[11] Baojia system, a form of local political organization. A jia was composed of 10 households, a bao was composed of 10 jia. Jiazhang was the head of a jia, baozhang was the head of a bao. Both were unpaid positions.

[12] A youth organization of the Kuomintang era.

[13] Mao Zedong died in September 9^th, 1976.